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Abstract
Given that Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) are plu-
tocratic, and other common consensus protocols are mostly permission-
based, we look for a consensus protocol that will suit the needs of e-
Democracy. In particular, what we need is a distributed ledger that will
record and, to the possible extent, execute the public will. We propose a
combination of any given permission-based protocol together with a trust
graph between the nodes, which supplies the required permission for new
nodes. As a result, the consensus protocol reaches consensus at every it-
eration between a known list of agents and then updates this list between
iterations. This paper is based on prior work that shows the conditions
under which a community can grow while maintaining a bounded num-
ber of byzantines [9]. It combines a permission-based consensus protocol
(such as pBFT [5]) with a community expansion algorithm (such as the
one in the prior work) to arrive at a consensus protocol in which the set
of agents can change in time, while being sybil-resilient.
1 Introduction
In e-Democracy operating via a distributed ledger, we would want the nodes to
be the citizens; i.e., one person - one vote, all the way down to the consensus
infrastructure. We start by noticing that in an e-Democracy based on a dis-
tributed ledger there are two types of required consensuses: mining consensus
and voting consensus.
Mining consensus To maintain a distributed ledger all participating nodes
need to be in consensus about what is written in the ledger. One key to achieve
such consensus is the separation between what is claimed and the validity of the
claim. In a slightly different view it is the difference between agreeing that Alice
votes for Bob and agreeing that Bob is the chosen leader. We call the ”what
is claimed” consensus - the mining consensus. It is easier to agree on ”what is
claimed” (Alice votes for Bob), especially as cryptography gives Alice a way to
prove that this is what she said, by signing this statement with her private key.
If one node in the distributed ledger refuses to register her claim, she can easily
turn to another node for the registration process.
The threat model for this consensus is the byzantine problem - the problem
of confusion between the ranks. This is the problem where some of the honest
nodes believe that the majority of the nodes agree one way, and some other
honest nodes believe that the majority of the nodes agree another way. If Alice
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is malicious, this can lead to a double spend attack where Alice convinces some
of the nodes that there is consensus (over majority of honest nodes) that she
voted for Bob, and in the same time she convinces some other nodes that there
is a consensus (over majority of honest nodes) that she voted for Carol. This
threat model is completely resolved (using pBFT [5] for example) if the number
of participants is at least n = 3f + 1, where f is the number of byzantines.
Voting consensus The consensus over the democratic validity of the claim
(or agreeing that Bob is the chosen leader) is what we call the voting consensus.
In some social manner, it is harder to achieve, since people tend to disagree
even on objective facts when it compromises their emotional believes. However,
given an agreed voting mechanism (including a reliable registrar) and given an
agreed list of voters, it is easy to reach a democratic decision simply by counting
majority of votes.
The threat model for this consensus is when the corrupted voters infiltrate
enough Sybil voters in order to overcome majority. In this attack everyone
will reach consensus that Carol is the leader, even though majority of genuine
identities (honest and corrupted) voted for Bob. The way to overcome this
threat, given a known bound on the ratio of Sybils, is to require super-majority
of votes. This method looses liveness (that is, the community is stuck in the
current state of affairs) when n < 3f + 1, however this is a linear degradation.
If n = 3f + 1, then a super-majority of 2f + 1 should be required, meaning that
even a single genuine identity (together with f sybils) can block any proposal.
1.1 Reaching consensus for e-Democracy
To reach voting consensus we need to have a trusted list of voters. To have a
trusted list of voters we need a trusted registration system with mining consen-
sus. It is not clear however how to achieve mining consensus without having
voting consensus over who is a valid miner. This is the bootstrap problem. One
way to solve it is by trusting a group of founders to build a small community
and grow the community step by step. This however gives a great deal of power
to the founders in moulding the shape of the community. Our approach in gen-
eral is to distribute the decision making power of the group among all members
of the group, in a way that each new member, once joined, will have exactly
his proportional share in the decisions of the group, including in processes that
started before he joined. Specifically in this paper we deal with two basic pro-
cesses, 1 - deciding who is in the group, and 2 - logging the group history. These
two functions merge on the specific task of logging the history of who is in the
group (who joins when).
There is a plethora of academic and industry work about consensus pro-
tocols. Largely, they are divided into permissionless protocols, like POW and
POS, where anyone can freely join the group of agents running the protocol,
and permissioned protocols, where all the agents maintain a list of all partic-
ipating agents and the protocol reach consensus explicitly among this group.
Known permissionless protocols lean on resources burning or owning that make
them less ideal for democratic governance. POW has a negative impact on the
environment and POS is plutocratic. Permissioned protocols are simpler, but
they are not distributed enough. This paper describes a consensus protocol that
is semi-permissioned. It starts with a permissioned protocol, but distribute the
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permission authority among all agents. This way it maintains the simplicity of
permissioned protocols, while gaining the scalability of permissionless protocols.
1.2 Related Work
We refer to Proof-of-Work (POW) and to bitcoin [8] as its first outstanding
implementation, as a starting point to our discussion. proof of work enables the
creation of a distributed ledger which is permissionless. Anyone can join the
network that is running the distributed ledger, without affecting the safety of
the protocol, or even improving the safety, as it grows as the network is further
distributed. However it holds grave consequences. In order to achieve safety in
a permissionless group, the participants keep competing among themselves in
solving the small hash problem, all for the sake of creating an order between
them. A computation whose output is completely useless once the order is de-
cided. As a result, the bitcoin network of processing units consumes more power
than an average country [2]. The second problem is that the POW protocol is
plutocratic by nature. Richer participants can invest more in hardware, which
makes them even more stronger and richer participants.
Proof-of-Stake (POS) [1] can resolve the electricity power arm racing prob-
lem. the order of participation can be determined by the amount of stake the
participant has in the network. It is also permissionless. Anyone can join and
as more participants join the system gets more robust. There is no need for
solving useless problems. Yet, again, by design, POS is plutocratic as well.
On the other end of the scale, pBFT [5] is considered the flag protocol for
permissioned distributed ledger. If the group of participants is known, two
rounds of verification messages among the group are enough to reach consensus.
As the number of messages for each consensus round is of order O(n2), this
protocol does not scale well for more then several hundreds, or at most thousands
of participants.
There are multiple attempts to create distributed ledger protocols that let
anyone join on their own act. Byzcoin [6] uses POW as a Proof-of-Membership,
and then uses pBFT for a more efficient consensus among the members. Need
to elaborate further.
The Proof-of-Identity concept relies on some off-chain mechanism to identify
the participants, which can then prove their identity with cryptographic means
to participate in the distributed ledger network. Though the concept is widely
discussed, we did not encounter yet a distributed ledger implementation using
it.
In Proof-of-Personhood [3] Borge et al. propose to conduct pseudonym par-
ties, where group of people physically meet in one place to create cryptographic
tokens for the participants. Though they discuss scalability briefly by proposing
to conduct multiple parties simultaneously in different regions, it is hard to see
such parties scale to worldwide proportions.
Two versions of Ethereum, parity and geth, implement the aura and clique
consensus protocols that use Proof-of-Authority. A Proof-of-Authority proto-
col [4] uses a chosen set of miners which in turn put their reputation as a stake.
The Stellar protocol, Federated byzantine agreement [7], runs the consensus
protocol within quorum slices. Each node marks which quorum slices it trusts
(and hence part of). The protocol ensures that consensus is achieved between
quorums with intersection, but it does not guarantee global consensus.
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In 1997, Rubinstein and Kasher propose [10] to look on the question of who is
a member of a given society as a social choice question, aggregating the opinions
of the members of the society themselves. It is in the spirit of this approach
that we proposed [9] a method for a sybil resilient community growth.
1.3 Paper structure
We present our protocol in stages, analyzing each stage and its validity. In
section 3 we start with a simple protocol that only adds new nodes in each
iteration. In section 4 we handle the case of nodes leaving the trust graph. We
finalize with a complete protocol in section 5, that not only adds and removes
nodes, but also carefully merges history between joined communities.
2 Preliminaries
We put forward our two main tools, namely a consensus protocol and a function
that maintains a sybil-resilient community.
2.1 Consensus Protocl
Among permissioned protocols, pBFT is probably the most common reference
solution. We take it as an example for the combined protocol proposed inhere,
but generalize it as follows. A permissioned consensus protocol in the context
of this paper has the following characteristics.
Definition 1 (Consensus). A Consensus function is a protocol that adheres to
the following requirements:
1. It is a replicated state machine, where each node maintains an internal
state and a set of accepted events. The state machine is deterministic,
and all nodes start from the same initial state, therefore if all nodes agree
on the order of incoming events, then all nodes maintain the same state
all the time.
2. It is asynchronic in the sense that the network connecting the nodes may
fail to deliver messages, delay them, duplicate them or deliver them out
of order. We do assume one relaxation to this requirement, that by some
unknown bounded time a message delivered from a proper node to another
proper node will eventually arrive.
3. It maintains safety, that is it satisfies linearizability between operations,
similar to a centralized implementation.
4. It maintains this list of requirements under the assumption that less than
βcp · n nodes are faulty.
Formally, the Consensus function returns either true or false, whether all
nodes accept the given event as the next event. This is a slight adaptation to
the more common implementation of a replicated state machine, where an event
stays in queue until it is accepted by the consensus protocol. We do it for the
clarity of the protocols to follow.
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2.2 Resilient Community Function
In a prior work [9] we identify the conditions under which a community can
grow while maintaining a bound on the number of sybils. For the purpose of
this work we generalize the following community growth function:
Definition 2 (ResilientCommunity). A ResilientCommunity function is a
protocol that adhere to the following requirements:
1. It accepts as input a graph G = (A, V,E) where V = H unionmulti C unionmulti S (honest,
corrupt and sybils respectively) and A ⊂ V is a set of nodes with bounded
number of corrupt and sybils.
2. It accepts as input an additional set of nodes A′ ⊂ V .
3. It assumes a bounded number of corrupt nodes in A: |A∩C||A| ≤ γ.
4. It assumes a bounded number of byzantine in A: |(A∩C)∪(A∩S)||A| ≤ 12 .
5. it outputs true if |(A∪A
′)∩(C∪S)|
|(A∪A′)| ≤ βrc.
In plain words, the above function examine the graph as the users add nodes
to the community A. The function accepts the new set of nodes, if it can
guarantee that the number of byzantine in the community stays below βrc.
Our community growth method [9] achieves that by inspecting the connectivity
of the graph. We also assume, though it is not articulated above, that there
is always a way to add new nodes to the graph under the above conditions
(liveness), so a community that maintains a bound on the number of corrupt
nodes can continue to grow iteratively.
3 From Community Expansion to Consensus
The protocol in this section describes the handling of a new event sent to the
replicated state machine. It starts with running a permissioned consensus pro-
tocol that adheres to the requirements in definition 1. This consensus protocol
uses the list of nodes of the graph that the replicated state machine stores in its
current state as the list of agents that should reach consensus. Once the event is
accepted, the protocol updates the graph structure according to the community
growth procedure described in definition 2.
It is custom in distributed ledgers, like bitcoin, to differentiate between the
computer nodes that participate in the consensus protocol (the miners) and
the users that sign the transactions to be logged in the ledger (the clients). In
the approach given here there is one pool of identities. Both the nodes that
participate in the consensus protocol, and the users that sign the transactions
to add edges to the graph, are the same identities. When an edge is created
between v1 and v2, it is v1 and v2 that sign the transaction, and it is the same
v1 and v2 that will participate in the consensus protocol, once they enter the
community A.
5
Protocol 1 Semi permissioned consensus protocol – event handling
1: init state with an empty graph
2: init logger with an empty log
3: function HandleEvent(state, event)
4: G← state.getGraph()
5: (A, V,E)← G.deconstruct()
6: if IsValid(event) then
7: if Consensus(A, event) then
8: logger.log(event)
9: if event.getType() is CONNECT IN G then
10: edges ←event.getEdges()
11: for all edge ∈ edges do
12: E ← E ∪ {edge}
13: end for
14: end if
15: if event.getType() is EXTEND COMMUNITY then
16: A′ ←event.getCommunity()
17: C1 ←CorruptionOracle(A ∪A′)
18: C2 ←ResilientCommunity(G, A′)
19: if C1 and C2 then
20: A← A ∪A′
21: end if
22: end if
23: end if
24: end if
25: end function
3.1 The protocol
Note that the weakness of the ResilientCommunity protocol is that it depends
on an external assumption that the number of corrupt nodes within the com-
munity A is bounded. We capture this external assumption by the following
oracle definition.
Definition 3 (CorruptionOracle). A CorruptionOracle is a magic function
that verifies that the corrupt nodes portion in a community A is less than γ.
The protocol starts with an empty graph and log. This guarantees that all
replicas start with the same initial state. When the consensus community A
is empty we assume that the Consensus function will accept any event it is
given (if no one objects, then everyone agree). We discuss the bootstrapping of
the protocol further in subsection 3.3. The first thing the protocol does is to
extract the graph structure from its internal state (lines 4,5). Once the validity
of the input event is checked, the protocol runs the consensus protocol, and if
successful (all replicas accept the event), it is written to the log (added to the
ledger). The protocol then reacts to two types of special events. The first (lines
9-14) simply adds edges (and possibly new nodes that are connected to them)
to the underlying graph G. The second (lines 15-22) is a request to grow the
consensus community A. It is accepted under two conditions, that the oracle
verifies that the bound on corrupt identities is not crossed, and that the resilient
6
community method verifies that the bound on byzantines was not exceeded. The
protocol is then ready to handle the next event.
3.2 Validity propositions
Under the assumption that honest nodes in the generation of the community
graph (nodes without edges to sybil nodes) will behave honestly also in the
consensus protocol (will not be faulty), as long as the amount of corrupt nodes
is bounded, protocol 1 is a valid consensus protocol. More formally:
Proposition 1 (Honests are honest). Let γ be the required bound on corrupt
nodes in definition 2 to achieve a bound βrc on the ratio of byzantine nodes.
Assume:
1. βrc ≤ βcp.
2. A node v ∈ H is not faulty in the consensus protocol.
3. CorruptionOracle ensures less than γ corrupt nodes in every iteration of
protocol 1.
Then Protocol 1 maintains the requirements of definition 1.
Proof. The call to ResilientCommunity in line 18, together with assumption
3, assure that the ratio of byzantine nodes in the graph is not more than βrc.
Assumption 1 assures that the ratio of byzantine nodes is also not more than
βcp. It follows from assumption 2 that requirement 4 in definition 1 holds. All
other requirements are indifferent to protocol 1.
In the sybil resilient community growth paper [9] we showed that using ver-
tex expansion a community can keep the byzantine ratio below β as long as the
vertex expansion of the graph is higher than γβ . We also showed that a graph
with vertex expansion Φv ≥ 25 is quite feasible. It follows from proposition 1
that if the community can make sure, that in any given point in time the ratio
of corrupt identities in the community is less than 215 , then it can maintain a
community with less than 315 sybil identities, and over all less than
1
3 byzan-
tines. Under these conditions such a community can safely use protocol 1 as a
consensus protocol within the community.
The assumption that honests are honest marks one end of the spectrum.
At the other end we can make an opposite assumption that there is no in-
tersection between byzantines-to-the-consensus-protocol and byzantines-to-the-
resilient-community-protocol. Under this assumption protocol 1 can tolerate up
to βcp byzantines of the first type (anarchists) and βrc byzantines of the second
type (corrupt and sybils).
Proposition 2 (Anarchists are not corrupt). Let γ be the required bound on
corrupt nodes in definition 2 to achieve a bound βrc on the ratio of byzantine
nodes. Assume:
1. CorruptionOracle ensures less than γ corrupt nodes in every iteration of
protocol 1.
2. An additional procedure AnarchistOracle (not listed in protocol 1) en-
sures less than βcp faulty nodes in every iteration of protocol 1.
7
Then Protocol 1 maintains the requirements of definition 1.
Proof. As long as some external protocol ensures that less then βcp nodes are
faulty, the Consensus procedure maintains its requirements, regardless of the
underlying graph between the nodes. Protocol 1 therefore maintains the same
requirements as well.
3.3 Growing the Network as the Graph Grows
To better understand the interplay between nodes of the consensus protocol and
the clients that commit transactions, consider first the code for the main loop
of the protocol.
Protocol 2 Semi permissioned consensus protocol – main loop
1: function MainLoop(neighbour)
2: if neighbour is not empty then
3: history ←neighbour.getLog()
4: for all event ∈ history do
5: HandleEvent(state,event)
6: end for
7: end if
8: while true do
9: event← wait for event
10: HandleEvent(state,event)
11: end while
12: end function
To demonstrate the interplay further, consider the following inefficient, yet
explanatory example.
Step 1: The first computer A starts running. It initializes with an empty
graph.
Step 2: A receives an event to add B and C to its underlying graph G.
Step 3: A receives an event to add B and C to the community of trusted
nodes.
Note that at this point we expect that the Consensus procedure, when run-
ning the consensus protocol on an empty set of nodes, will return true (if no one
objects, then everyone agrees). Therefore the first two events are consensually
accepted. Secondly, at this point node A is blocked from receiving any further
events, as such event will only be accepted by consensus among the set {B,C},
but nodes B and C are not yet in the network. From A’s perspective, both B
and C are byzantine at this point.
Step 4: Computers B and C start running, initialized with an empty graph.
Step 5: Computers B and C join the network of A by querying it for the
history of events. B and C then run the history of events locally and reach
the same internal state as A.
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Figure 1: Interplay between computer nodes in the network and identity nodes
in the graph. Each rectangle is a computer. The graph within represents its
internal state.
From this point all three nodes are synchronized and can run the consensus
protocol together to continue accepting new events. Note that A can participate
in this process, though all three nodes, when aiming for consensus, adhere only
to the messages from B and C, as A is not part of the trust graph.
4 Edge Removals
Removing an edge from a trust graph in the above setting is problematic. While
the community can add nodes one at a time while maintaining graph connec-
tivity, when removing an edge the graph might split in the middle, and it is
not clear which are the nodes that should be removed. A better solution for
community growth, with the ability also to shrink back, should probably include
not only the possibility to create edges between nodes that wish to be in the
community, but also marking nodes as ’bad’ nodes that should not appear in
the graph. One way to do it might be through creating edges with negative
weights, to capture that node v1 states that node v2 should not be in the com-
munity. This will require directional graphs, as one can expect pairs of nodes to
agree simultaneously to be part of the same community, but it will be strange to
demand from v1 to get the permission of v2 to repel him from the community.
For now we propose the following notion of nodes and edges removal (see
protocol 3), which will partially allow the community to shrink, as long as it
take precaution to remove edges in a valid order. In short, the protocol accepts
a request to remove a set of nodes from A if the graph remains highly connected
without it. Specifically, it tests whether the graph remains resilient (line 6)
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and if the bound on corrupt nodes is maintained (line 7). If the conditions do
not hold, then it disregards the request to remove the nodes, and do nothing.
Removing edges from the underlying graph G is done unconditionally (lines
12-19), as long as the edges are not in A.
Protocol 3 Semi permissioned consensus protocol – edge removal
1: . . .
2: function HandleEvent(state, event)
3: . . .
4: if event.getType() is REDUCE COMMUNITY then
5: A′ ←event.getCommunity()
6: C1 ←ResilientCommunity(A \A′)
7: C2 ←CorruptionOracle(A \A′)
8: if C1 and C2 then
9: A← A \A′
10: end if
11: end if
12: if event.getType() is DISCONNECT IN G then
13: edges ←event.getEdges()
14: for all edge ∈ edges do
15: if edge /∈ A then
16: E ← E \ {edge}
17: end if
18: end for
19: end if
20: . . .
21: end function
Observation 1 (Communities can always shrink). There is always an order of
events that will cause a community to shrink all the way to an empty graph.
The observation holds due to the symmetry between protocol 3 and proto-
col 1. Both make sure that in every modification of A the community remains
resilient and corruption free before and after the change. In both protocols the
addition and removal of edges outside A is without conditions. These symme-
tries ensure that an ‘undo’ path of events is always feasible. That is, growing
the community with a series of growing steps, and then shrinking it back in a
reverse order of events will safely shrink the community back to its initial state.
There are two cases where the protocol should allow to safely remove a node
from the community. The first is when a node is discovered to be a sybil node.
The second is when a genuine node (honest or corrupt) represent an identity that
ceased to exist (either passed away or decided to disconnect from the ledger).
It is not clear how to always remove a node, when it is situated in a bottleneck
that may split the community into two loosely connected parts. We assume,
however, that it is always possible to remove any individual node by creating
new connections (edges) between the two parts to increase their connectivity.
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5 Joining Communities
Up until now new nodes joining the ledger started from scratch, by reading the
ledger from another node and updating their internal state to be aligned with
the state of the community (see subsection 3.3). In this section we want to
consider the more sophisticated scenario where two communities (two sets of
nodes), each with its own ledger and history, wish to join together to become a
single community. Distributed ledgers are by nature closed environments, as the
state of each replica cannot depend on reading of any external inputs, as there
are no guarantees that all replicas will read the same input. For this reason, one
distributed ledger cannot read the state of another distributed ledger. Nodes
participating in one distributed ledger all start from the same initial state, and
they all read the same history of events. Two different set of nodes, in two
different current state, have no way to reach the same internal state, even if
from one point onward they will always accept the same events. More then
that, even if one ledger had a magical way to bring itself up to date with the
state of the second ledger, there is no way to enforce the second ledger (the
second set of nodes) to do the same. The merge must be symmetric. Yet, as
each ledger is external environment to the second ledger, there is no methodical
way to guarantee symmetric execution.
We therefore look at the merging process as two unidirectional processes.
Ledger 1 accepts an event that triggers the assimilation of ledger 2, while in
a separate and unrelated event, ledger 2 starts the assimilation of ledger 1. If
the result is identical (hash value of the state is the same) then the union of all
replicas of both ledgers are in the same state, and are now ready to consume
the next event and reach consensus over it over the joined group of replicas.
As discussed, the ledgers cannot resolve if the result is identical by themselves
and only an external intervention (as human intervention) can arbitrate the
question and conclude that the ledgers are indeed merged. Actually, from the
ledgers perspective, they are never fully merged, as each ledger will indefinitely
maintain the history before the merge which is different then the history of the
second ledger.
The symmetric assimilation of each other’s state is implementation depen-
dent. A ledger of currency might need to modify the addresses of all accounts,
to avoid conflict between accounts with the same id in both ledgers. A smart
contract of voting might need to carefully identify the combined community,
while merging duplicates, and then join together all gathered votes between the
two communities. We therefore cannot represent a method for this process in
the scope of this paper, but we do assume that any distributed ledger applica-
tion must have a way to correctly merge two partial states into one joined state.
The correctness of this merge is not only application dependent, but it might
also be preference dependent. One community may prefer to treat duplicate
currency account as separate accounts (accidentally having the same id) while
another community may prefer to treat duplicate accounts as duplicate accounts
of the same agent, and therefore prefer to merge them together into one joined
account.
Definition 4 (MergeStates). A MergeState is an implementation specific ex-
ternal function that receives two different states and returns a single state that
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is a safe merge of the two states and symmetric, in the following sense:
MergeState(state1,state2)=MergeState(state2,state1)
Protocol 4 combines the previous protocols, with the addition that when
adding nodes to the community of trusted agents, their history is added to the
internal state of the distributed ledger. As explained, this process is unidirec-
tional. When community A reads the history of community A′ and adds it to
the distributed ledger, it does not merge with the nodes of community A′, only
create a local copy of their history within the ledger of community A. If the
same process will simultaneously occur within the network of community A′,
then the two communities will be aligned (in the same internal state) and will
be able to jointly handle any future events. Alternatively, community A′ can
wait silent until community A finishes to update the joined ledger, and then
discard their (A′) ledger and join the ledger of A in a similar method to the one
presented in subsection 3.3. Successfully merging two ledgers of two communi-
ties is therefore an external process that is controlled by the operators of this
system and cannot be fully automated. However, Protocol 4 gives the necessary
conditions for such an external process to succeed.
6 Conclusion
We showed a safe way to integrate a consensus protocol with a community
growth protocol – based on a trust graph – to conduct and manage a distributed
ledger within a community where all members are taking part in the ledger
maintaining process. We showed the conditions under which the safety of the
consensus protocol is maintained. For future work it will be of interest to run a
stochastic simulation of the above protocol.
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